多层次冲突图模型研究

基本信息

书名：多层次冲突图模型研究(英文版)

定价：89.00元

作者：Shawei,He

出版社：科学出版社

出版日期：2017-10-01

ISBN：9787030547545

字数：

页码：155

版次：1

装帧：平装

开本：16开

商品重量：0.4kg

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内容提要

Three real world conflicts with hierarchical structure are discussed ithis Shawei’s《多层次冲突图模型研究(英文版)》：controversies over the water diversions iChina，the petitioithe sales ofaircraft betweeAirbus and Boeing，and the disputes betweethe USA and Chinaover greenhouse gas emissions．Ieach conflict，the resolutions for DMs obtained by the stability calculations reflect their broader visioand their Drehensiveunderstanding of the hierarchical conflicts．
　　By developing these hierarchical graph models，this book adopts a quantitativeapproach to analyzing interrelated conflicts for researchers．The intensive 8tudvof the three real world conflicts ithe book cagive new and signiflcant insightstpractitioners to mitigate，resolve，or eveavoid conflicts．

目录

Contents
Preface
Notatio
Chapter 1 Introductio1
1.1 Hierarchical Conflicts 1
1.2 Classical Approaches to Conflict Analysis 3
1.3 Research Objectives 6
1.4 Outline 8
Chapter 2 Graph Model for Conflict Resolutio10
2.1 Formal Definitioof Graph Model 10
2.2 Joint Movement and Joint Unilateral Improvement 11
2.3 OptioForm and OptioPrioritizatio13
2.4 Matrix Representatioof Graph Model 14
2.5 SolutioConcepts 16
2.6 DecisioSupport System: GMCR II 18
Chapter 3 A Lead-iExample: Water DiversioConflicts iChina 19
3.1 Water Resources iChina 19
3.2 The South-North Water DiversioProjects iChina 20
3.3 Graph Model of Water DiversioConflict iChina 24
3.3.1 DecisioMakers 24
3.3.2 Options 25
3.3.3 The Status Quo State 26
3.3.4 Removing Infeasible States 26
3.3.5 Ranking of Feasible States 27
3.4 Stability Analysis of the Hierarchical Water DiversioConflict iChina 29
3.4.1 Stability Calculatioof the Hierarchical Conflict 29
3.4.2 Stability Analysis of the Separate Conflicts for the Three Routes 30
3.5 Comparisoof the Three Separate Conflicts with the Overall Dispute 32
3.6 Summary 33
Chapter 4 Basic Hierarchical Graph Model with Lecographic Preference 35
4.1 Formal Definitions 35
4.1.1 Framework of Basic Hierarchical Graph Model 36
4.1.2 Lecographic Preference 38
4.2 Moves and Improvements 40
4.3 Interrelationships of Stabilities betweeBasic Hierarchical Graph Model and Local Graph Models 41
4.3.1 Nash Stability (R) 42
4.3.2 Sequential Stability (SEQ) 43
4.3.3 General Metarationality (GMR) 46
4.3.4 Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) 47
4.4 Water DiversioConflicts iChina 49
4.4.1 Conflict Modeling 50
4.4.2 Stability Analysis 53
4.4.3 Oute Interpretatio56
4.4.4 Comparisoof the Two Case Studies iChapter 3 and Sectio4.5 57
4.5 Summary 58
Chapter 5 Basic Hierarchical Graph Model iMatrix Form with Weighted Preference 59
5.1 Formal Definitions 59
5.1.1 Weighted Preference 60
5.1.2 Connectiowith Lecographic Preference 61
5.1.3 Reachable Matrix 61
5.1.4 UI Matrix 62
5.1.5 Joint Movement and Improvement Matrices 63
5.2 Stability Definitions 63
5.3 Interrelationship BetweeStabilities ithe Hierarchical Graph and the Local Graphs 64
5.3.1 Nash Stability (R) 65
5.3.2 Sequential Stability (SEQ) 65
5.3.3 General Metarationality (GMR) 67
5.3.4 Sequential Metarationality (SMR) 68
5.4 Algorithms for Calculating Stability 69
5.4.1 Nash Stability (R) 69
5.4.2 Sequential Stability (SEQ) 69
5.4.3 General Metarationality (GMR) 71
5.4.4 Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) 71
5.5 Reinvestigatioof Water DiversioConflicts iChina 72
5.6 Comparisoof Weighted Hierarchical Graph Model and Former Methodologies 77
5.7 Summary 78
Chapter 6 Duo Hierarchical Graph Model 79
6.1 Formal Definitions 79
6.1.1 Definitioof Duo Hierarchical Graph Model 79
6.1.2 Lecographic Preference Structure 81
6.2 Sales CompetitiobetweeAirbus and Boeing 82
6.2.1 DecisioMakers and Their Options 83
6.2.2 States ithe Sales Competitio85
6.2.3 Preferences of DecisioMakers 86
6.2.4 The Uncertainty of Preferences for LDMs 87
6.2.5 Stability Calculatio90
6.2.6 Comparisowith the Results iSeparate Competitions 94
6.3 Summary 97
Chapter 7 General Hierarchical Graph Model 98
7.1 Formal Definitions 98
7.2 Preference Structures based oOptioPrioritizatio100
7.3 Interrelationships of Stabilities betweeGeneral Hierarchical Graph Model and Local Graph Models 104
7.3.1 Nash Stability (R) 104
7.3.2 Sequential Stability (SEQ) 104
7.3.3 General Metarationality (GMR) 105
7.3.4 Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) 106
7.4 Steps for Calculating Stabilities 106
7.5 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Disputes betweeChina and USA 107
7.5.1 Conflict Background 107
7.5.2 Conflict Modeling 108
7.5.3 Removal of Infeasible States 112
7.5.4 Stability Analysis 112
7.5.5 Evolutioof the Conflict 115
7.5.6 Implications for DecisioMakers 116
7.5.7 Comparisoof Stability Results 117
7.6 Summary 119
Chapter 8 Conclusions and Further Study 120
8.1 Major Contributions 121
8.2 Assumptions and Limitations of Hierarchical Graph Models 122
8.3 Further Study 123
References 125
Appendix A Proofs for Theorems 134
A.1 Proof for Theorem 4.1 134
A.2 Proof for Theorem 4.3 134
A.3 Proof for Theorem 4.4 135
A.4 Proof for Theorem 4.6 136
A.5 Proof for Theorem 4.7 137
A.6 Proof for Theorem 4.8 138
A.7 Proof for Theorem 4.11 139
A.8 Proof for Theorem 4.12 139
A.9 Proof for Theorem 5.1 141
A.10 Proof for Theorem 5.2 142
A.11 Proof for Theorem 5.4 144
A.12 Proof for Theorem 5.6 145
A.13 Proof for Theo

作者介绍

文摘

序言

Contents
Preface
Notatio
Chapter 1 Introductio1
1.1 Hierarchical Conflicts 1
1.2 Classical Approaches to Conflict Analysis 3
1.3 Research Objectives 6
1.4 Outline 8
Chapter 2 Graph Model for Conflict Resolutio10
2.1 Formal Definitioof Graph Model 10
2.2 Joint Movement and Joint Unilateral Improvement 11
2.3 OptioForm and OptioPrioritizatio13
2.4 Matrix Representatioof Graph Model 14
2.5 SolutioConcepts 16
2.6 DecisioSupport System: GMCR II 18
Chapter 3 A Lead-iExample: Water DiversioConflicts iChina 19
3.1 Water Resources iChina 19
3.2 The South-North Water DiversioProjects iChina 20
3.3 Graph Model of Water DiversioConflict iChina 24
3.3.1 DecisioMakers 24
3.3.2 Options 25
3.3.3 The Status Quo State 26
3.3.4 Removing Infeasible States 26
3.3.5 Ranking of Feasible States 27
3.4 Stability Analysis of the Hierarchical Water DiversioConflict iChina 29
3.4.1 Stability Calculatioof the Hierarchical Conflict 29
3.4.2 Stability Analysis of the Separate Conflicts for the Three Routes 30
3.5 Comparisoof the Three Separate Conflicts with the Overall Dispute 32
3.6 Summary 33
Chapter 4 Basic Hierarchical Graph Model with Lecographic Preference 35
4.1 Formal Definitions 35
4.1.1 Framework of Basic Hierarchical Graph Model 36
4.1.2 Lecographic Preference 38
4.2 Moves and Improvements 40
4.3 Interrelationships of Stabilities betweeBasic Hierarchical Graph Model and Local Graph Models 41
4.3.1 Nash Stability (R) 42
4.3.2 Sequential Stability (SEQ) 43
4.3.3 General Metarationality (GMR) 46
4.3.4 Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) 47
4.4 Water DiversioConflicts iChina 49
4.4.1 Conflict Modeling 50
4.4.2 Stability Analysis 53
4.4.3 Oute Interpretatio56
4.4.4 Comparisoof the Two Case Studies iChapter 3 and Sectio4.5 57
4.5 Summary 58
Chapter 5 Basic Hierarchical Graph Model iMatrix Form with Weighted Preference 59
5.1 Formal Definitions 59
5.1.1 Weighted Preference 60
5.1.2 Connectiowith Lecographic Preference 61
5.1.3 Reachable Matrix 61
5.1.4 UI Matrix 62
5.1.5 Joint Movement and Improvement Matrices 63
5.2 Stability Definitions 63
5.3 Interrelationship BetweeStabilities ithe Hierarchical Graph and the Local Graphs 64
5.3.1 Nash Stability (R) 65
5.3.2 Sequential Stability (SEQ) 65
5.3.3 General Metarationality (GMR) 67
5.3.4 Sequential Metarationality (SMR) 68
5.4 Algorithms for Calculating Stability 69
5.4.1 Nash Stability (R) 69
5.4.2 Sequential Stability (SEQ) 69
5.4.3 General Metarationality (GMR) 71
5.4.4 Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) 71
5.5 Reinvestigatioof Water DiversioConflicts iChina 72
5.6 Comparisoof Weighted Hierarchical Graph Model and Former Methodologies 77
5.7 Summary 78
Chapter 6 Duo Hierarchical Graph Model 79
6.1 Formal Definitions 79
6.1.1 Definitioof Duo Hierarchical Graph Model 79
6.1.2 Lecographic Preference Structure 81
6.2 Sales CompetitiobetweeAirbus and Boeing 82
6.2.1 DecisioMakers and Their Options 83
6.2.2 States ithe Sales Competitio85
6.2.3 Preferences of DecisioMakers 86
6.2.4 The Uncertainty of Preferences for LDMs 87
6.2.5 Stability Calculatio90
6.2.6 Comparisowith the Results iSeparate Competitions 94
6.3 Summary 97
Chapter 7 General Hierarchical Graph Model 98
7.1 Formal Definitions 98
7.2 Preference Structures based oOptioPrioritizatio100
7.3 Interrelationships of Stabilities betweeGeneral Hierarchical Graph Model and Local Graph Models 104
7.3.1 Nash Stability (R) 104
7.3.2 Sequential Stability (SEQ) 104
7.3.3 General Metarationality (GMR) 105
7.3.4 Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) 106
7.4 Steps for Calculating Stabilities 106
7.5 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Disputes betweeChina and USA 107
7.5.1 Conflict Background 107
7.5.2 Conflict Modeling 108
7.5.3 Removal of Infeasible States 112
7.5.4 Stability Analysis 112
7.5.5 Evolutioof the Conflict 115
7.5.6 Implications for DecisioMakers 116
7.5.7 Comparisoof Stability Results 117
7.6 Summary 119
Chapter 8 Conclusions and Further Study 120
8.1 Major Contributions 121
8.2 Assumptions and Limitations of Hierarchical Graph Models 122
8.3 Further Study 123
References 125
Appendix A Proofs for Theorems 134
A.1 Proof for Theorem 4.1 134
A.2 Proof for Theorem 4.3 134
A.3 Proof for Theorem 4.4 135
A.4 Proof for Theorem 4.6 136
A.5 Proof for Theorem 4.7 137
A.6 Proof for Theorem 4.8 138
A.7 Proof for Theorem 4.11 139
A.8 Proof for Theorem 4.12 139
A.9 Proof for Theorem 5.1 141
A.10 Proof for Theorem 5.2 142
A.11 Proof for Theorem 5.4 144
A.12 Proof for Theorem 5.6 145
A.13 Proof for Theo